Vickie M. Nielsen v. The Estate of Mary Jane Hefferon : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Vickie M. Nielsen v. The Estate of Mary Jane
Hefferon : Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul M. Halliday, Jr.; Paul M. Halliday; Halliday, Watkins & Henrie.
Russell C. Fericks; Melinda A. Morgan; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellee.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Nielsen v. Hefferon, No. 981711 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1869
I.. «rt COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH B R ' E F 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO WW-CM 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VICKIE M NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff Appellant, 
vs. 
THE ESTATE OF MARY JANE 
HEFFERON, 
Defendant/Appellee 
APPEAL No. 981711-CA 
Priority No. 15 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING ON DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
ENTERED IN THIS MATTER ON NOVEMBER 4, 1999 
Paul M. Halliday, Jr. 
PaulM Halliday 
HALLIDAY, WATKINS & HENRIE 
376 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RUSSELL C. FERICKS [A3793] 
MELINDA A. MORGAN [A8392] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
1 :' 1999 
rAPPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VICKIE M. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
THE ESTATE OF MARY JANE 
HEFFERON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
APPEAL No. 981711-CA 
Priority No. 15 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING ON DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
ENTERED IN THIS MATTER ON NOVEMBER 4, 1999 
Paul M. Halliday, Jr. 
Paul M. Halliday 
HALLIDAY, WATKINS & HENRIE 
376 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RUSSELL C. FERICKS [A3793] 
MELINDA A. MORGAN [A8392] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
SUMMARY 
In its Memorandum Decision of November 4, 1999, this 
Court reversed both the trial court's denial of plaintiff's 
motion to amend her Complaint and the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. In doing so, 
defendant believes the Court inadvertently and inappropriately 
merged two separate issues. Clarification of the Court's intent 
regarding these two separate issues is necessary to guide the 
trial court's further proceedings. 
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant, this Court reasoned that: 
Because plaintiff's affidavits and proposed 
amended pleadings raised genuine issues of 
material fact bearing on [1] fraudulent 
inducement and [2] alteration of the release, 
summary judgment for defendant was 
inappropriate. 
Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision, filed November 4, 1999, at 
2. (bracketed numeration and bold text added.) In reversing the 
trial court's denial of plaintiff's Motion to Amend, the Court's 
Decision goes on to say: 
The trial court erred by relying on [the best 
evidence rule] in that plaintiff does not 
dispute the content of the release produced 
by defendant. Rather, plaintiff claims that 
defendant either [1] fraudulently induced her 
into signing the release or [2] fraudulently 
altered the release. 
Id. (bracketed numeration added,) 
These are two entirely separate issues: [1] fraudulent 
inducement to entering into the Release; and [2] fraudulent 
alteration of the Release. The defendant acknowledges the basis 
for the Court's ruling about parol evidence on the first issue; 
and while defendant does not particularly like the result, it is 
willing to live with it. But there is absolutely no basis or 
evidence to support the submission of the second issue to a jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO DISPUTE OVER THE FACT THAT THE 
ORIGINAL RELEASE IS AUTHENTIC. 
In her own Motion to Amend in the trial court, the 
plaintiff did not distinguish or articulate a separate 
"fraudulent alteration" claim or issue; she requested leave only 
to add "claims of fraud and bad faith." (R. at 51.) In fact, not 
until the hearing on the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the 
plaintiff's Motion to Amend Answer did plaintiff's counsel even 
request to examine the original Release. (R. 123 at 17:8-19.) 
Then, after studying the Release with his client for several 
minutes, plaintiff's counsel told the Court, "Your Honor, these 
2 
appear to be our signatures, but I don't know how it got on this 
document." (R. 123 at 18:3-5.) 
When the Court asked plaintiff's counsel how it was 
that the original Release did not have any interlineations on it, 
and plaintiff's counsel's copy did, plaintiff's counsel had no 
coherent explanation. (R. 123 at 18:6-9.) In addition, 
plaintiff's counsel acknowledged that there was only one 
original.1 In essence, the totality of the evidence is that the 
original Release is an unaltered original. 
Obviously, based on the Court's Memorandum Decision, 
the plaintiff can now argue that entry into the original Release 
1
 The Court: 
Okay. But you don't have one [Release] with 
original signatures any place in your files 
or your client's? 
Mr. Halliday: 
No, because we just received the one release. 
The Court: 
You just received the one? 
Mr. Halliday: 
Just that one, Your Honor [indicating the 
original presented by defendant]. 
P. 123 at 18:13-19. ) 
3 
was induced by fraudulent misrepresentations, and plaintiff can 
support that claim with parol evidence. But this is an entirely 
different issue from whether or not the original Release itself 
is genuine or has been altered. 
In order to prove her theory that the original Release 
has somehow been altered, plaintiff has the burden to produce 
some credible evidence. The right to amend under Rule 15(c), 
U.R.Civ.P., requires more than just a showing of timeliness, or a 
justification for delay, as cited by the Court on page one of its 
Memorandum Decision. It also requires a threshold showing that 
the claim which plaintiff has been given leave to add--in this 
instance, fraudulent alteration of the original Release--has at 
least a modicum of substantive merit. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 
602, 608 (Utah 1974). The newly identified and perhaps 
unintentionally articulated claim, has no factual merit. The 
parties' intentions in entering into the Release are irrelevant 
to whether the original Release is authentic or not. 
Not a scintilla of evidence exists to suggest that the 
original has been altered or that it is not authentic. 
Ironically, it is plaintiff's photostatic copy of the Release 
which has been altered, and which will require considerable 
explanation before it can be admitted into evidence. Utah Code 
4 
Ann, § 78-25-17. Hence, the trial court's admonition to 
plaintiff's counsel that pursuing such a course of evidence was 
''raising the stakes of this going both ways considerably." (R. 
123 at 17:8-19:5.) 
POINT II 
THIS COURT INADVERTENTLY MADE A RULING ON THE ISSUE 
OF AUTHENTICITY THAT WAS NOT BEFORE IT. 
The defendant requests that this Court re-address its 
ruling regarding the authenticity of the original Release. This 
issue was not properly before the Court on appeal. Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend and Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
never contested the authenticity of the original Release, only 
that plaintiff had been fraudulently induced to enter it. 
Plaintiff's counsel concedes the original is authentic, and that 
it bears his and his client's signatures. 
The Court's statement in its Memorandum Decision that 
"affidavits and proposed amended pleadings" raised genuine issues 
of material fact is inaccurate with respect to the original 
Release's authenticity, since all the facts support its 
authenticity and none contradict it. Defendant would be 
prejudiced by having this decision stand as it is currently 
written since it would require defendant to re-establish what has 
5 
already been conceded and to prove at the trial level what was 
never contested on appeal. 
Every litigant knows that the trial process is fraught 
with uncertainty and surprises. The Court's broad language in 
the Memorandum Decision inadvertently grants to plaintiff the 
opportunity to win on an issue--the fraudulent alteration of the 
original Release--which has never even been pled or alleged. 
Prejudice to defendant, under these circumstances, is not merely 
the inconvenience and expense of trying an inappropriate claim, 
but potentially suffering the entry of a jury verdict on that 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the defendant does not agree with the Court's 
ruling regarding the issue of fraudulent inducement, it respects 
the Court's opinion on this issue, and is confident that the jury 
will rule in its favor on this issue. However, the defendant 
requests the Court to take a fresh look at the Memorandum 
Decision, as it bears upon the authenticity of the Release. No 
evidence shows that this original Release has been altered in any 
way, and the signatures on it are, as plaintiff concedes, 
genuine. 
6 
The best evidence rule does apply to this original 
writing, since no one disputes its authenticity. It will be the 
plaintiff's burden at trial to show that this concededly 
authentic document was somehow fraudulently induced, but 
plaintiff should not have the additional benefit of being able to 
argue the separate issue of alteration to the original Release. 
Pursuant to Rule 35 Utah R. App. P., the undersigned 
counsel hereby certifies that this Petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / day of November, 
1999. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage 
prepaid, on this l%jjL day of November, 1999, to the following: 
Paul M. Halliday, Jr. 
Paul M. Halliday 
HALLIDAY, WATKINS & HENRIE 
376 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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